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to 2007 and up to 17 different forecasts per year, we test for a possible asymmetry of the forecasters' 
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of Elliot et al. (2005). Furthermore, we test for the rationality of the forecasts under the assumption of a 
possibly asymmetric loss function and for the features of an optimal forecast under the assumption of a 
generalized loss function. We find only limited evidence for the existence of an asymmetric loss 
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1. Introduction
The assumption that economic agents behave rationally when they form their expectations is a 
central assumption in economics and finance. Consequently, a large body of literature has 
investigated the accuracy and rationality of forecasts, including several studies regarding German 
business cycle forecasts (see, e.g., Fildes and Stekler, 2002, for a survey and Döpke and Fritsche, 
2006 for an overview of related papers for German data). Virtually all these studies, however, 
regardless of whether made explicitly or implicitly, analyse the issue under the assumption of a 
symmetric loss function; i.e., the notion that over- and underestimations are equally costly to the 
respective forecaster. While this assumption has been more or less undisputed for a long period of 
time, it may be criticised for very good economic reasons. 
Consider possible customers of business cycle forecasters: For example, for a single firm, there is 
a priori absolutely no reason why the costs of underpredicting demand in terms of a loss of sales or 
reputation should be exactly equal to the costs of overpredicting demand in terms of additional cost 
and storage (Elliot et al., 2005, 2008). On a macroeconomic level, it is very likely that e.g. central 
banks have asymmetric preferences regarding inflation, perhaps in the direction of more caution 
against inflation acceleration. Alan Blinder summarises his experience as a central bank officer, 
claiming that a central bank “take (s) far more political heat it tightens preemptively to avoid higher 
inflation than it eases preemptively to avoid higher unemployment” (Blinder, 1998). Furthermore, 
while a overestimation of a budget deficit may foster the career of a finance minister, an 
underestimation may end it. Or, as famous German economist and politician Ludwig Erhardt put it: 
”If it gets better than expected, even the false prophet will be forgiven” (quoted according to, e.g., 
Miersch, 2008). Furthermore, international or supranational institutions like IMF, World Bank, or 2
the European Commission face agency problems regarding their relationships with clients or 
member states – which, in turn, could justify asymmetric loss functions (Artis and Marcellino: Elliott 
et al., 2005; Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis 2008, 2009). An additional line of argumentation, 
which may point to the possibility of an asymmetric loss, is the political economy of business cycle 
forecasts (see Döpke 2000 for related arguments). In this view, individual forecasters represent 
competing political points of view and use the forecasts as instruments to achieve their political 
goals. Hence, under- and overestimations of growth and inflation are likely to be unequally costly in 
the eyes of the forecaster, since they give different incentives for good or bad policies. All in all, a 
certain scepticism regarding the symmetry assumption is therefore well justified. We will therefore 
analyse signs for asymmetric loss functions for those institutions publishing regular forecasts for the 
German economy. 
Consequently, several approaches have been developed to incorporate more general loss function 
into forecasting evaluations. Based on influential work by Chistofferson and Diebold (1997), 
Granger (1999), and Batchelor and Peel (1998), among others, Elliott et al. (2005, 2008) have 
proposed to estimate the degree of asymmetry of the loss function and to test for a significant degree 
of asymmetry. Moreover, Patton and Timmerman (2007) analysed the properties of an optimal 
forecast under a generalised loss function and discussed how to test for these properties. We make 
use of these approaches to re-evaluate the issue of rationality of the German business cycle forecasts; 
namely growth and inflation forecasts covering the time span from 1970 to 2007 and up to 17 
different forecasts. 
We find only limited evidence for asymmetric loss functions of German business cycle 3
forecasters. Moreover, the point estimates of the degree of asymmetry are not systematic in any 
respect: some forecasters seem to have incentives for too-pessimistic forecasts; others, for too-
optimistic forecasts. Over and above this, the results appear to be not fully robust against the choice 
of the instruments warranted to estimate the loss function with an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimator. 
Furthermore, we check whether the usual results concerning the rationality of the forecasts still 
hold, when the assumption regarding the loss function is relaxed. In a nutshell, we find that neither a 
specifically asymmetric loss function nor the assumption of a generalized loss function alter the 
findings obtained under a symmetric loss function by very much, though the results of the test 
proposed by Elliot et al. (2005) give some contrary results for inflation forecasts.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the data and presents 
some general statistics on forecast accuracy. Section 3 describes the econometric method proposed 
by Elliot et al. (2005) to back out the parameter of asymmetry of a loss function and statistical 
testing for the existence of asymmetry and discusses the results for the data set at hand. Section 4 
tests for the rationality of the forecasts under different assumptions: a symmetric loss function, an 
specific asymmetric loss function, and a generalised loss function. The final section summarises and 
concludes. 
2. Data and descriptive statistics
In the following section we evaluate the forecasts of several institutions that deliver macroeconomic 4
forecasts regarding the German economy. Details on the data set under investigation can be found in 
Döpke and Fritsche (2006). For all institutions, we have collected the growth and inflation forecasts. 
The growth forecast is the predicted growth rate of real GNP (for the time span 1983 to 1989) and of 
real GDP (for all other years). In case of published interval forecasts the average is used. The 
numbers refer to West Germany up to 1992, and to the whole of Germany from 1993 to present. As 
a measure of the inflation forecast we use the predicted change of the deflator of private 
consumption when this figure was available. In some cases, however, no explicit reference was 
given whether a mentioned inflation forecast referred to the consumption deflator or to the CPI/ 
HICP. In such cases we assume that no distinction between the figures was intended by the 
forecaster and used the available inflation forecast. As regards the actual outcome, it is possible to 
refer to the last available revised data or to the first published ("real-time") data. As it is common in 
the analysis of business cycle forecasts, we make use of the latter type of numbers i.e. we compare 
the forecasts made at the end of a certain year "x" or at the beginning of the following year "x+1" 
with the first published figure for the year "x+1”.
To give a first impression of some forecast properties and the forecast errors, Table 1 presents a 
couple of standard measures of forecast accuracy for each institution separately. In particular, we 
calculate the following statistics:
4 











, where  1 1 1 ˆ + + + - = t t t y y e  is the forecast error in each period, 
defined as actual (in t+1) minus predicted (in t for period t+1) value of the variable y. Thus, 
a positive (negative) value of the mean error corresponds to an under (over-) estimation of 
the growth rate. Subscript t is the time index.
4 Unless otherwise stated our notation follows the textbook of Diebold (1998).5

























iv. A version of Theil's coefficient, which compares the RMSE of the forecast under 
investigation with the RMSE of a “naive” forecast. In our case, the naïve forecast is given by 
a “no change” forecast in terms of growth rates, i.e. for the following year the same growth 
or inflation rate than in the previous year is predicted. A value greater than one for the 
coefficient indicates that the forecast is worse than the naïve forecast.
v. The first order autocorrelation coefficient of the forecast errors.
¾ Insert Table 1 here ¾
Turning to our results, the findings in Table 1 confirm the findings of a lot of previous studies. To 
begin with, the mean error of the growth forecasts is negative in all but one case suggesting on 
average a slight tendency of the forecasters to be too optimistic. The absolute and root mean squared 
errors indicate the magnitude of the forecast errors, which is, as has often been documented by 
various authors (see Döpke and Fritsche 2006 and the literature cited therein), substantial and 
exceeds by far the expectations on forecast accuracy by public opinion. As far as the growth 
forecasts are concerned, however, Theil’s coefficient suggests that the forecasts still contain valuable 
information when compared to a “no change”-forecast. By contrast, this does not hold for the 
inflation forecasts, where the coefficient comes close to, or even exceeds, 1. This might be due to the 6
fact that inflation is typically a quite persistent process – empirically even often indistinguishable 
from a random walk process – whose “optimal” forecast is often found to be close to or identical 
with the last observation. This is further supported by the first order correlation coefficient reported 
in the last column of Table 1: while the respective numbers for the growth forecasts are usually 
small with alternating signs, the autocorrelation of the inflation forecast errors is consistently 
positive and frequently quite large.
3. Estimating loss function asymmetry parameters and testing for asymmetry 
The analysis by Elliot et al. (2005) starts from the general loss function:
Lp,,=[1−2⋅1yt1−  yt10∣yt1− yt1∣
p]   (1)
In this loss function the parameter p represents the underlying assumption of the subsequent 
analysis. In particular, p=1 stand for a linear-linear (lin-lin) loss function, while in case of p=2 the 
calculations are based on a quadratic-quadratic (quad-quad) loss function. Furthermore, the loss 
function consists of a parameter   . It represents the degree of asymmetry of the loss function. In 
particular,  =0.5 yields a symmetric loss function, while  0.5 represents the case of 
forecasters' incentives to issue optimistic forecasts. Finally,  0.5 stands for the case of too-
pessimistic forecasts. Thus, a particular set of parameters leads to well-known loss function. For 
example  L1,1/2,=yt1− yt1
2 yields a symmetric quadratic loss function (Elliot et al. 2005: 
1110). The key problem addressed by Elliot et al. (2005) is, of course, that the value of this 
parameter is unknown and has to be estimated from the data. 7
Elliot et al. (2005) establish conditions for optimality of forecasts, which, in turn, deliver the 
moment condition for the IV estimator. By observing the sequence of forecasts, the authors propose 
a GMM estimator that yields the following expression to estimate the  asymmetry parameter of the 







































as a weighting matrix. Since S depends 
on  T , estimation has to be performed iteratively, assuming S = I in the first round since the 
identity matrix is a consistent starting point and using  vt as instrument(s). Hence, the estimation is 
based on considerations that have led to the GMM estimator proposed by Hansen (see Hansen and 
West, 2002, for a survey and a discussion of its relation to macroeconomic applications). Elliot et al. 
(2005) show that the estimator of T is asymptotically normal and, hence, renders it possible to 
test for the hypothesis  =0.5 i.e. for loss function symmetry. 
For the proposed GMM estimator  appropriate instruments are warranted. Following  Elliot et al. 
(2005: 461), our instruments are: i) a constant; ii) a constant and a lagged forecast error; iii) a 
constant and the lagged variable to be predicted (i.e. the growth and inflation rate, respectively); and 
iv) a constant, the lagged forecast error, and the lagged variable to be predicted. The estimation 8
results for the data set under investigation are given in Table 2.
¾ Insert Table 2 here ¾
As regards the growth forecasts and the calculations based on the assumption of a lin-lin loss 
function the findings revealed in Table 2 suggest only very limited evidence for asymmetric loss 
functions. Only in case of the Berlin Institute do the results point to a loss function giving incentives 
for too-pessimistic forecasts. Depending on the number instruments there are also some weak 
(significant at the 10 % level) hints for a loss function of the Council of Economic Advisers 
fostering too-optimistic forecasts. These results may support some conventional wisdom regarding 
these institutions: the Berlin Institute has long been seen as the most pronouncedly Keynesian among 
German institutes. Thus, being pessimistic might be plausible to achieve a more activist economic 
policy. By contrast, the Council of Economic Advisers has widely be seen as very supply-side 
oriented and the opposite behaviour may be seen as plausible. However, such interpretations are 
surely exaggerated since other institutes with strong opinions (Trade Union Institute or Employers 
Institute, for example) show no similar results. The test results are also illustrated by visual 
inspection of the estimated loss functions given in Figure 1.
¾ Insert Figure 1 here ¾
Without the mentioned exceptions all loss functions look quite symmetric, representing the fact that 
virtually all estimated   parameters are very close to 0.5.9
Turning to the inflation forecasts, there are more hindsights to asymmetric loss functions. The Joint 
Forecast as well as the Council of Economic Advisers have incentives to overestimate inflation, 
while the Berlin Institute is more likely to underestimate it. Again, visual inspection of the estimated 
loss functions in Figure 1 confirms the picture given by the formal statistical tests.
Based on the assumption of a quad-quad loss-function for growth forecasts the broad picture remains 
more or less unchanged; i.e., there is hardly any convincing evidence for a significant degree of 
asymmetry across the board of the forecasting institutions (Table 3).
¾ Insert Table 3 here ¾
There are some differences from the lin-lin case, however. First, the Berlin Institute appears to have 
a symmetric loss function in this case. The autumn forecast of the European Commission, the 
autumn forecast of the IMF; that of the Halle Institute and, again, the forecast of the Council of 
Economic Advisers show a significant degree of asymmetry, all pointing to incentives to too-
optimistic forecasts. Of course, the results for the Halle Institute should be taken with particular 
caution, due to the very small number of observations (the Institute was founded in 1992). 
¾ Insert Figure 2 here ¾10
As regards the inflation forecasts, four institutions show significant asymmetry: the Joint Forecast in 
autumn, the Kiel Institute, the Hamburg Institute, and the Trade Unions Institute. All four have a 
value for the asymmetry parameter, giving incentives for too-high inflation predictions. While this 
result might meet expectations in all other cases, it might come as a surprise in case of the Trade 
Unions Institute. However, in all four cases the results have to be taken with great cautiousness since 
they are not robust against the choice of the instruments (see section 4.2.2 on this issue). 
4. Testing for rationality and optimality of a forecast under different loss 
functions
4.1 Testing for rationality under a symmetric loss function
Testing the rationality of a forecasts under a symmetric loss function is typically based on two 
requirements for the forecast: first, the forecast should be unbiased; i.e., no systematic errors should 
occur – the expected value of the forecast error should not be different from zero. Second, the 
forecast should make efficient use of all information available at the forecasting date; i.e., an optimal 
forecast one should be unable to find any variable, which helps to forecast the errors. In a nutshell, 
former studies of the rationality of German business cycle forecasts have typically found them 
unbiased, but not necessarily efficient 
To obtain a first insight into the rationality of the forecasts under investigation, we present rationality 
tests based on a version of the Mincer-Zarnowitz equation (Batchelor and Peel, 1998). In particular, 
a standard rationality test  can be based on estimating the equation:11
ytn− ytn ,t=a0a1 ytn ,t−ytutn (4)
As Batchelor and Peel (1998), referring to Christofferson and Diebold (1997) argue, under the null 
hypothesis of rationality and assuming a symmetric loss function, forecast errors should be 
orthogonal to all information known at t, and in particular to the expected change in y. Thus, if the 
forecast is rational,  a0=0, a1=0 holds. This is tested with a standard F-test. The results of this 
task are given in Table 4.
¾ Insert Table 4 here ¾
The results, documented in Table 4, give little hints of departures from rationality. In case of the 
growth forecasts only the Halle Institute shows a significant rejection of the null hypothesis of 
forecast rationality. This comes as no real surprise, since the Halle Institute was not (re-)founded 
before 1991, joining the forecast club in 1993. The resulting very short sample reminds to be 
extremely cautious in interpreting this result. Turning to the inflation forecasts, four institutions 
show a significant rejection of the null hypothesis. Again, the Halle Institute is among them, but this 
might be due to the very short sample. Since the IMF forecasts are delivered relatively early as 
compared to the other forecasts, the non-rationality of these forecasts might be a result of the long 
forecast horizon. The other results remain to be explained.12
4.2 Rationality testing under an asymmetric loss function
4.2.1 The Batchelor / Peel (1998) approach
One approach to test for forecast rationality under an asymmetric loss function has been proposed 




where   and   are constants and  e  is the forecast error as described above. The parameter 
 determines the degree of asymmetry, while  is a scaling factor. The form of the loss function 
and the impact of   on the asymmetry of the loss function is illustrated in Figure 3. 
¾ Insert Figure 3 here ¾
For  0 , losses are approximately exponential for  e0 and approximately linear for  e0 . 
If the forecast error is defined as in our case, this defines a situation where underestimations are 
more costly than overestimations. Conversely, with  0  the function is exponential to the left of 
the origin of  e , and linear to the right. Asymptotically for  =0 ,the function coincides with the 
standard quadratic case.
The standard rationality test resulting in equation (1) may be extended as follows: Batchelor and 
Peel (1998) argue that under the a linex loss function the optimal forecast has a clearly defined bias. 13
This bias, in turn, depends on the volatility of the time series to be foretasted and has an analytical 
expression for the linex loss function. Thus, to test for rationality, an additional term in the test 
equation is warranted that reflects the expected value of the conditional error variance:




Again the null of a rational forecast is represented by the parameter restriction a0=0, a1=0 . 
Thus, in empirical testing, Batchelor and Peel (1998) suggest to estimate an ARCH-in-Mean model, 
tracing back to Engle, Lilian and Roberts (1987). In their original paper, they suggest a GARCH(1,1) 
model, but argue that the test for rationality does not depend on a specific form of the ARCH-in-
Mean term. Hence, in our case, we start with the presumably most simple GARCH(1,1) and use 
other models only in cases where this model does not fit well to the data. It turned out that, in most 
cases, using the log for the ARCH-in-Mean term helps to achieve convergence. All in all, the test is 
performed by estimating the following equations:









As in the original contribution of Batchelor and Peel (1998) the ARCH-in-Mean terms turn out to be 
insignificant in most of the cases under investigation here. However, the presence of this term might 
alter the estimates of the other coefficients in the equation and, thus, the results of testing for 14
rationality, namely  a0=0, a1=0 . The results presented in Table 5 suggest that in virtually all 
cases the null of rationality cannot be rejected for the growth forecasts considered in this paper. The 
results changes, when considering the inflation forecast errors; however, again the results do not 
differ qualitatively from the case of a symmetric loss function.
¾ Insert Table 5 here ¾
4.2.2 The Elliot et al. (2005) approach
Elliot et al. (2005) suggest a test of the joint null hypothesis of forecast rationality and the underlying 
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Hence, a rejection of the hypothesis might be due to irrationality of the forecast or due to the 
rejection of the functional form of the loss function. The results for our data at hand are given in 
Table 6. 
¾ Insert Table 6 here ¾
In case of growth forecasts and the lin-lin setting, the null hypothesis has to be rejected only in very 
few cases. In particular, for the IMF (autumn forecast), the OECD, and the Council of Economic 
Advisers the hypothesis is not supported by the data. However, in none of the three cases, the result 15
appears to be robust against the choice of the instruments. Thus, the hints for either irrationality of 
the forecasts or the necessity of a different loss function are not convincing. By contrast, the results 
for the inflation forecasts lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis for virtually any of the institutions 
under investigation. Given the point estimates of the asymmetry parameter reported in Section 3, one 
might suspect that the rejection is due to the failure of the rationality hypothesis rather than due to 
the assumption of a particular loss function, but formally the test does not tell anything about this. 
However, the results reported for similar tests based on the assumption of a quad-quad loss function 
yield a similar picture: again, there are very few results, if any at all, pointing to the rejection of the 
null for the growth forecasts, but the inflation forecasts fail to achieve rationality under this 
particular loss function. Hence, all in all, the rationality of growth forecasts is generally supported by 
the J-test while the rationality of the inflation forecasts is much more in doubt. It is noteworthy that 
the the null of rationality is frequently rejected, when the lagged forecast errors are used as 
instruments which implies that the orthogonality condition between actual and lagged forecast errors 
does not hold. This finding corresponds to the high positive autocorrelation of the inflation forecast 
errors reported in Table 1.
4.2.3 Testing the properties of an optimal forecast under a general loss function
Recently, Patton and Timmerman (2007) have proposed a set of tests for forecast optimality 
under a generalized loss function. Under the joint hypothesis that the forecasts are optimal, the loss 
function is solely a function of the forecast error, and the dynamics of the predicted variable show no 
dynamics beyond the conditional mean, the forecast errors should be homoscedastic (Patton and 
Timmermann 2007: 12). This hypothesis may easily be tested using the procedure proposed by 





and the hypothesis  a1=a2==a L=0 is tested. If rejected, the test result implies that either the 
forecast is not optimal or one of the other assumptions (no dynamics beyond the conditional mean 
and loss function depending solely on the forecast errors) does not hold. The results for the German 
business cycle forecasts are presented in Table 7.
¾ Insert Table 7 here ¾
With the exception of three forecasting institutions and only in the case of their respective 
inflation forecast we are never able to reject the hypothesis – even at the 10 per cent level. 
According to that criterion there is no evidence for heteroscedastic forecast errors. Hence, the 
forecasts have to be considered as optimal insofar as the loss function is solely a function of the 
forecast errors.
To test the assumption of no dynamics beyond the conditional mean directly; however, it is 
warranted to model the conditional mean. We do this by estimating a simple ARMA(1,1) model of 
output growth and inflation respectively.
5 In both cases, the model removes all autocorrelation up to 
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with a p-value for remaining autocorrelation of 0.76.17
order 3. In contrast to the data analysed by Patton and Timmermann (2007), we do not find any 
significance of the squared residuals of these equations. Thus, we cannot confirm any evidence 
against the optimality of the forecasts under investigation. Furthermore, Patton and Timmermann 
(2007) suggest to rely on a quantile-related approach. This test relies on an indicator function:
I t1=1yt1 yt1 . With this variable at hand, the following equations are estimated 
respectively:
I t1=a0a1  yt1ut1 (8)
I t1=a0a1  yt1a2 Itut1 (8')
¾ Insert Table 8 here ¾
The null hypothesis is given by  a1=0 and  a1=a2=0 , respectively. If rejected, the test 
implies either the rejection of conditional variance dynamics in the data generating process of GDP 
growth or inflation, or a rejection of the optimality of the forecast at hand and any loss function 
which is at least homogeneous in the forecast error. The results for the German data set are given in 
Table 8. As mentioned in Patton and Timmermann (2007: 9) it is also possible to estimate equation 
(8) and (8’) using a logit-approach. We have done so; the results are also presented in Table 8. All in 
all, we find evidence against the optimality of the forecast errors in very few cases only. In particu-
lar, the output forecasts appear to be rational.  As regards the inflation forecast there are two cases 
with a significant violation of the optimality requirements in case of OLS estimation. However, even 
in these cases the finding is not confirmed by the logit estimation.18
5. Conclusion
The paper analyses the degree of asymmetry of German business cycle forecasts, namely growth and 
inflation forecasts covering the time span from 1970 to 2007 and up to 17 different forecasts. We 
find the forecasts to be mostly symmetric with only few exceptions. The point estimates of the 
degree of asymmetry are not systematic in any respect: some forecasters seem to have incentives for 
too-pessimistic forecasts, some others for too-optimistic forecasts. The results appear to be not fully 
robust against the choice of the instruments warranted to estimate the loss function with a GMM 
approach. We also investigate the rationality of the forecasts at hand. To this end, we do not 
exclusively rely on the assumption of a symmetric loss function, but make use of approaches based 
on an asymmetric or even flexible loss function. In a nutshell, we find that neither a specifically 
asymmetric loss function nor the assumption of a generalized loss function alter the findings ob-
tained under a symmetric loss function by very much, though the results of the test proposed by 
Elliot et al. (2005) give some contrary results for inflation forecasts.
Given the results of this paper, some further research may be required. First, is must be checked, 
whether data with a higher frequency may alter the results. Having more data may help the estimate 
the asymmetry parameter with greater precision and, hence, lead to more cases with a significant 
degree of asymmetry. Second, it may be worthwhile to try to estimate the asymmetry parameter for 
government in order to compare it with the values for the forecasters. It is plausible to assume that 
the political authorities have different loss functions than do forecasters; which may, in turn, explain 
some of the bad image of business cycle forecasts in the public opinion. 19
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for forecast errors, 1970 to 2007







coefficient of forecast 
error (p-value)
Growth forecasts
Berlin Institute  0.04  1.02  1.47  0.61 0.08 (0.63)
Council of Economic Advisors -0.29  1.01  1.42  0.59 0.03 (0.85)
Employer's Institute a) -0.27  1.17  1.67  0.69 -0.25 (0.15)
Essen Institute -0.23  1.00  1.31  0.54 0.11 (0.53)
European Commission, autumn -0.42  1.18  1.62  0.67 -0.03 (0.87)
European Commission, spring -0.19  0.78  1.08  0.45 0.14 (0.40)
Government's Economic Report -0.21  0.95  1.37  0.57 -0.14 (0.41)
Halle Institute b) -0.29  0.68  0.92  0.38 -0.37 (0.20)
Hamburg Institute -0.15  0.95  1.34  0.56 -0.08 (0.66)
IMF, autumn c) -0.63  1.33  1.77  0.73 0.01 (0.97)
IMF, spring d) -0.12  0.86  1.19  0.50 0.29* (0.08)
Joint Forecast, autumn -0.32  1.19  1.61  0.67 -0.01 (0.96)
Joint Forecast, spring  -0.20  0.80  1.14  0.47 -0.01 (0.97)
Kiel Institute -0.20  1.04  1.50  0.62 0.03 (0.87)
Munich Institute -0.09  0.93  1.29  0.53 -0.13 (0.45)
OECD -0.30  1.05  1.53  0.63 -0.08 (0.63)
Trade Union' Institute -0.08  1.13  1.55  0.64 -0.05 (0.75)
  Inflation forecasts
Berlin Institute  0.19  0.70  0.93  0.94 0.36** (0.03)
Council of Economic Advisors  0.03  0.71  0.94  0.96 0.47*** (0.003)
Employer's Institute a) -0.03  0.52  0.74  0.75 0.20 (0.24)
Essen Institute  0.09  0.60  0.83  0.84 0.55*** (0.001)
European Commission, autumn  0.07  0.68  0.93  0.95 0.56*** (0.0003)
European Commission, spring -0.02  0.37  0.47  0.48 0.25 (0.12)
Government's Economic Report  0.16  0.59  0.88  0.89 0.38** (0.019)
Halle Institute b)  0.02  0.50  0.69  0.70 0.22 (0.46)
Hamburg Institute  0.03  0.64  0.92  0.93 0.47*** (0.004)
IMF, autumn c) -0.10  0.67  0.91  0.92 0.31* (0.07)
IMF, spring d) -0.15  0.58  0.83  0.84 0.42** (0.017)
Joint Forecast, autumn  0.02  0.77  1.03  1.05 0.58*** (0.002)
Joint Forecast, spring   0.05  0.44  0.58  0.59 0.22 (0.20)
Kiel Institute  0.19  0.76  1.15  1.17 0.62*** (>0.001)
Munich Institute -0.03  0.59  0.84  0.85 0.24 (0.16)
OECD -0.04  0.56  0.76  0.78 0.19 (0.29)
Trade Union' Institute  0.02  0.78  1.05  1.07 0.55*** (0.004)
Notes: a) 1972 to 2007; b) 1993 to 2007; c) 1973 to 2007; d) 1971 to 2007. e) p-value refers to a two sided test of the null hypothesis of an 
autorcorrelation coefficient equal to zero. *** (**, *) denotes rejection of the null at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.21
Table 2: Evidence for an asymmetric loss function, lin-lin function
Panel (A): growth forecasts
k=1 s.e. p-value k=2 s.e. p-value k=3 s.e. p-value k=4 s.e. p-value
Berlin institute 0.324 0.077 0.022 0.319 0.077 0.0018 0.324 0.077 0.0018 0.318 0.077 0.0017
Council of Economic 
Advisers 0.595 0.081 0.241 0.595 0.081 0.241 0.639 0.079 0,079 0.639 0.079 0,079
Employer's Institute 0.571 0.084 0.393 0.575 0.084 0.372 0.573 0.084 0.383 0.578 0.083 0.351
Essen Institute 0.568 0.081 0.407 0.568 0.081 0.407 0.578 0.081 0.340 0.578 0.081 0.339
European Commission, 
autumn 0.541 0.082 0.621 0.542 0.082 0.611 0.547 0.082 0.563 0.550 0.082 0.545
European Commission, 
spring 0.486 82 0.869 0.486 0.082 0.869 0.486 0.082 0.869 0.486 0.082 0.869
Governments' Economic 
Report 0.514 0.082 0.869 0.514 0.082 0.866 0.515 0.082 0.854 0.516 0.082 0.850
Halle Institute 0.571 0.132 0.589 0.572 0.132 0.588 0.585 0.132 0.519 0.586 0.132 0.515
Hamburg Institute 0.432 0.081 0.407 0.432 0.081 0.403 0.428 0.081 0.373 0.427 0.081 0.370
IMF, autumn 0.588 0.084 0.296 0.588 0.084 0.296 0.624 0.083 0.136 0.624 0.083 0.136
IMF, spring 0.444 0.083 0.502 0.441 0.083 0.475 0.444 0.083 0.496 0.441 0.083 0.472
Join Forecast, spring 0.514 0.082 0.869 0.514 0.082 0.869 0.514 0.082 0.869 0.514 0.082 0.869
Joint Forecast, autumn 0.486 0.082 0.869 0.486 0.082 0.866 0.485 0.082 0.857 0.485 0.082 0.851
Kiel Institute 0.486 0.082 0.869 0.486 0.082 0.869 0.486 0.082 0.862 0.486 0.082 0.861
Munich institute 0.459 0.082 0.621 0.459 0.082 0.620 0.459 0.082 0.619 0.459 0.082 0.618
OECD 0.568 0.081 0.407 0.571 0.081 0.383 0.580 0.081 0.326 0.585 0.081 0.294
Trade Unions' Institute 0.486 0.082 0.869 0.486 0.082 0.866 0.485 0.082 0.857 0.484 0.082 0.857
Panel (B): inflation forecasts
Berlin institute 0.378 0.080 0.127 0.333 0.077 0.031 0.378 0.080 0.125 0.327 0.077 0.025
Council of Economic 
Advisers 0.649 0.078 0.058 0.704 0.075 0.007 0.678 0.077 0.021 0.714 0.074 0.004
Employer's Institute 0.514 0.084 0.866 0.515 0.084 0.861 0.515 0.084 0.859 0.515 0.084 0.856
Essen Institute 0.514 0.082 0.869 0.533 0.082 0.688 0.517 0.082 0.832 0.535 0.082 0.671
European Commission, 
autumn 0.568 0.081 0.407 0.602 0.080 0.206 0.568 0.081 0.406 0.606 0.080 0.189
European Commission, 
spring 0.432 0.081 0.407 0.428 0.081 0.374 0.432 0.081 0.406 0.428 0.081 0.374
Governments' Economic 
Report 0.432 0.081 0.407 0.416 0.081 0.297 0.432 0.081 0.407 0.414 0.081 0.291
Halle Institute
Hamburg Institute 0.568 0.081 0.407 0.588 0.081 0.274 0.569 0.081 0.400 0.588 0.081 0.274
IMF, autumn 0.441 0.085 0.490 0.427 0.085 0.392 0.441 0.085 0.490 0.427 0.085 0.389
IMF, spring 0.528 0.083 0.738 0.531 0.083 0.711 0.528 0.083 0.738 0.531 0.083 0.711
Join Forecast, spring 0.649 0.078 0.058 0.702 0.075 0.007 0.650 0.078 0.056 0.710 0.075 0.005
Joint Forecast, autumn 0.405 0.081 0.241 0.388 0.080 0.160 0.397 0.080 0.199 0.382 0.080 0.139
Kiel Institute 0.432 0.081 0.407 0.412 0.081 0.276 0.429 0.081 0.382 0.392 0.080 0.178
Munich institute 0.541 0.082 0.621 0.546 0.082 0.578 0.541 0.082 0.614 0.546 0.082 0.575
OECD 0.600 0.089 0.264 0.622 0.089 0.169 0.603 0.089 0.250 0.630 0.088 0.141
Trade Unions' Institute 0.514 0.082 0.869 0.519 0.082 0.819 0.515 0.082 0.856 0.523 0.082 0.78022
Table 3: Evidence for an asymmetric loss function, quad-quad loss function
Panel (A): growth forecasts
k=1 s.e. p-value k=2 s.e. p-value k=3 s.e. p-value k=4 s.e. p-value
Berlin institute 0,492 0,120 0,947 0,470 0,112 0,790 0,421 0,119 0,506 0,413 0,109 0,426
Council of economic advisers 0,647 0,104 0,159 0,645 0,103 0,157 0,689 0,099 0,057 0,686 0,099 0,060
Employer's institute 0,639 0,108 0,199 0,661 0,105 0,124 0,620 0,107 0,264 0,648 0,104 0,153
Essen institute 0,611 0,099 0,265 0,599 0,097 0,309 0,609 0,099 0,275 0,604 0,097 0,287
European commission, 
autumn 0,685 0,094 0,050 0,699 0,089 0,025 0,697 0,093 0,035 0,715 0,087 0,013
European commission, spring 0,608 0,103 0,298 0,598 0,104 0,344 0,621 0,101 0,230 0,609 0,101 0,280
Governments' economic 
report 0,614 0,106 0,279 0,616 0,105 0,270 0,618 0,101 0,245 0,614 0,102 0,263
Halle institute 0,674 0,175 0,320 0,877 0,092 0,000 0,858 0,098 0,000 0,872 0,092 0,000
Hamburg institute 0,592 0,108 0,392 0,597 0,107 0,366 0,605 0,106 0,321 0,608 0,106 0,309
IMF, autumn 0,745 0,085 0,004 0,748 0,084 0,003 0,878 0,059 0,000 0,881 0,058 0,000
IMF, spring 0,562 0,111 0,576 0,551 0,111 0,646 0,584 0,108 0,435 0,567 0,108 0,537
Join forecast, spring 0,624 0,107 0,245 0,632 0,099 0,185 0,641 0,104 0,175 0,645 0,098 0,138
Joint forecast, autumn 0,644 0,097 0,136 0,647 0,095 0,123 0,635 0,097 0,165 0,641 0,095 0,140
Kiel institute 0,609 0,108 0,313 0,609 0,106 0,302 0,591 0,109 0,406 0,599 0,106 0,351
Munich institute 0,555 0,110 0,620 0,562 0,109 0,568 0,565 0,108 0,547 0,571 0,108 0,510
OECD 0,645 0,103 0,162 0,668 0,096 0,080 0,641 0,104 0,175 0,676 0,095 0,063
Trade unions' institute 0,534 0,109 0,752 0,538 0,108 0,727 0,543 0,108 0,694 0,544 0,108 0,684
Panel (B): inflation forecasts
Berlin institute 0.383 0.103 0.259 0.352 0.102 0.146 0.382 0.103 0.252 0.351 0.102 0.143
Council of economic advisers 0.496 0.111 0.972 0.589 0.110 0.420 0.495 0.111 0.961 0.598 0.110 0.374
Employers institute 0.568 0.121 0.575 0.567 0.121 0.582 0.609 0.116 0.347 0.602 0.116 0.380
Essen institute 0.443 0.112 0.613 0.500 0.114 0.999 0.416 0.110 0.443 0.155 0.071 0.000
European commission, 
autumn 0.474 0.112 0.814 0.627 0.109 0.244 0.480 0.112 0.857 0.633 0.108 0.220
European commission, spring 0.544 0.105 0.675 0.601 0.098 0.303 0.548 0.103 0.644 0.602 0.098 0.296
Governments' economic 
report 0.388 0.116 0.336 0.384 0.116 0.319 0.388 0.116 0.336 0.381 0.116 0.306
Hamburg institute 0.501 0.119 0.993 0.679 0.108 0.098 0.518 0.119 0.878 0.677 0.107 0.099
IMF, autumn 0.626 0.106 0.234 0.649 0.104 0.151 0.634 0.104 0.200 0.634 0.104 0.198
IMF, spring 0.618 0.108 0.274 0.607 0.109 0.327 0.616 0.108 0.284 0.605 0.109 0.336
Joint forecast, autumn 0.518 0.111 0.872 0.773 0.087 0.002 0.536 0.112 0.744 0.773 0.087 0.002
Joint forecast, spring 0.444 0.107 0.605 0.448 0.107 0.629 0.468 0.104 0.758 0.462 0.104 0.713
Kiel institute 0.414 0.119 0.473 0.070 0.060 0.000 0.387 0.116 0.330 0.078 0.061 0.000
Munich institute 0.552 0.119 0.659 0.670 0.105 0.104 0.582 0.116 0.481 0.669 0.104 0.105
OECD 0.556 0.125 0.654 0.571 0.125 0.568 0.576 0.119 0.524 0.577 0.119 0.515
Trade unions' institute 0.509 0.112 0.938 0.681 0.098 0.065 0.509 0.112 0.936 0.698 0.097 0.04223
Table 4: Test for rationality of the forecasts under a symmetric loss function, 
1970 to 2007
  Constant Slope
Test for rationality 
(F-value)









































































































 a)1972 to 2007; b) 1993 to 2007; c) 1973 to 2007; d) 1971 to 2007.24
Table 4: continued
  Constant Slope
Test for rationality 
(F-value)









































































































 a)1972 to 2007; b) 1993 to 2007; c) 1973 to 2007; d) 1971 to 2007.25
Table 5: Test for rationality of the forecasts under an asymmetric loss function 
(Batchelor/Peel approach), 1970 to 2007
    Constant Slope
Test for rationality 
(F-value)





Coefficient  0.08  0.40  1.47 0.24
t-value  0.14  2.02    
Council of Economic Advisors
 
Coefficient  2.11 -0.33 5.22 0.01
t-value  0.52 -1.65    
Employer's Institute a)
 
Coefficient -0.47 -0.10 0.04 0.96
t-value -1.23 -0.41    
Essen institute
 
Coefficient -0.61 -0.14 0.55 0.58
t-value -2.70 -0.47    
European commission, autumn
 
Coefficient -0.03 -0.14 0.92 0.41




Coefficient -0.37  0.42 0.59  0.56 
t-value -1.38  2.12    
Government's economic report
 
Coefficient -0.23  0.06 0.02 0.98
t-value -0.56  0.27    
Halle Institute c)
 
Coefficient  0.02 -0.39 1.45 0.29
t-value  0.16 -1.11    
Hamburg Institute
 
Coefficient -0.70 -0.21 0.36 0.70
t-value -1.15 -0.71    
IMF, autumnd)
 
Coefficient -1.15 -0.04  1.38 0.27
t-value -1.69 -0.08    
IMF, spring e)
Coefficient  0.06  0.16 1.38 0.27
t-value  0.27  0.55    
Joint forecast, autumn
 
Coefficient  1.44 -0.46  0.37 0.69
t-value  0.50 -0.48    
Joint forecast, spring
 
Coefficient  1.44 -0.46  0.37 0.69
t-value  0.50 -0.48    
-Kiel Institute
 
Coefficient -2.19  0.20 1.22 0.31
t-value -0.36  0.36    
Munich Institute
 
Coefficient -0.42  0.03 0.24 0.78
t-value -0.44  0.25    
OECD
 
Coefficient -0.64 -0.30 0.03 0.97
t-value -1.46 -1.53    
Trade Unions' Institute
 
Coefficient  0.15  0.04 1.68 0.20
t-value  0.91  0.16    
 a)1972 to 2007; b) 1993 to 2007; c) 1973 to 2007; d) 1971 to 2007. e) Convergence could only be achieved after 
eliminating the year 1975 by a dummy variable in the mean equation. 26
Table 5: continued 
    Constant Slope
Test for rationality 
(F-value) Test for rationality (p-value)
Inflation forecasts
Berlin Institute Coefficient  0.08  0.40 8.66 0.00
  t-value  0.14  2.02
Council of Economic Advisors Coefficient  2.11 -0.33 1.15 0.33
  t-value  0.52 -1.65
Employer's Institute b) Coefficient -0.47 -0.10 2.31 0.12
  t-value -1.23 -0.41
Essen Institute Coefficient -0.61 -0.14 0.53 0.60
  t-value -2.70 -0.47
European Commission, autumn Coefficient -0.03 -0.14 1.65 0.21
  t-value -0.12 -0.62
European Commission, spring Coefficient -0.10  0.08 0.79 0.46
  t-value -0.50  0.43
Government's Economic Report Coefficient -0.23  0.06 0.21 0.81
  t-value -0.56  0.27
Halle Institute c) Coefficient
Convergence failed
Hamburg Institute Coefficient -0.70 -0.21 0.27 0.76
  t-value -1.15 -0.71
IMF, autumn a) Coefficient -1.15 -0.04 2.28 0.12
  t-value -1.69 -0.08
IMF, spring d) Coefficient  0.06  0.16 2.28 0.12
  t-value  0.27  0.55
Joint Forecast, autumn Coefficient  1.44 -0.46 11.30 0.00
  t-value  0.50 -0.48
Joint Forecast, spring Coefficient  1.44 -0.46 0.56 0.57
  t-value  0.50 -0.48
Kiel Institute Coefficient -2.19  0.20 11.66 0.00
  t-value -0.36  0.36
Munich Institute Coefficient -0.42  0.03 0.58 0.57
  t-value -0.44  0.25
OECD Coefficient -0.96 -0.19 0.69 0.51
  t-value -1.03 -0.46
Trade Unions' Institute Coefficient  0.15  0.04 2.67 0.08
  t-value  0.91  0.16
 a)1972 to 2007; b) 1993 to 2007; c) 1973 to 2007; d) 1971 to 2007. 27
Table 6: Joint test for forecast rationality and loss function (J-test), lin-lin function, 1970 to 
2007
J-test k=2 p-value J-test k=3 p-value J-test k=4 p-value
Panel (A): Growth forecasts
Berlin Institute 0,57 0,45 0,03 0,87 0,69 0,71
Council of Economic Advisers 0,01 0,93 5,90 0,02 5,90 0,05
Employers Institute 0,76 0,39 0,35 0,56 1,44 0,49
Essen Institute 0,00 0,98 2,38 0,12 2,39 0,30
European Commission, autumn 0,51 0,48 2,65 0,10 3,35 0,19
European Commission, spring 0,05 0,83 0,05 0,83 0,08 0,96
Government Report 0,48 0,49 2,01 0,16 2,45 0,29
Halle Institute 0,01 0,91 1,11 0,29 1,16 0,56
Hamburg Institute 0,13 0,72 1,24 0,27 1,36 0,51
IMF, autumn 0,00 0,98 4,88 0,03 4,89 0,09
IMF, spring 1,08 0,30 0,27 0,60 1,19 0,55
Joint Forecast, autumn 0,45 0,50 1,60 0,21 2,25 0,33
Joint Forecast, spring 0,02 0,89 0,02 0,90 0,04 0,98
Kiel Institute 0,04 0,84 1,02 0,31 1,19 0,55
Munich Institute 0,03 0,88 0,11 0,74 0,13 0,94
OECD 0,90 0,34 2,83 0,09 3,80 0,15
Trade Unions' Institute 0,43 0,51 1,63 0,20 2,50 0,29
Panel (b): Inflation forecasts
Berlin Institute 5,02 0,03 0,10 0,76 5,52 0,06
Council of Economic Advisers 4,99 0,03 3,02 0,08 5,62 0,06
Employer's Institute 0,57 0,45 0,87 0,35 1,14 0,56
Essen Institute 10,90 0,00 4,11 0,04 11,32 0,00
European Commission, autumn 6,21 0,01 0,03 0,86 6,66 0,04
European Commission, spring 1,21 0,27 0,05 0,83 1,21 0,55
Government Report 3,69 0,06 0,00 0,99 3,88 0,14
Hamburg Institute 4,37 0,04 0,26 0,61 4,37 0,11
IMF, autumn 3,22 0,07 0,00 0,97 3,32 0,19
IMF, spring 1,75 0,19 0,00 0,97 1,77 0,41
Joint Forecast, autumn 4,88 0,03 0,12 0,73 5,43 0,07
Joint Forecast, spring 2,93 0,09 1,55 0,21 3,70 0,16
Kiel Institute 4,33 0,04 0,92 0,34 6,94 0,03
Munich Institute 2,03 0,16 0,33 0,57 2,18 0,34
OECD 2,69 0,10 0,39 0,53 3,44 0,18
Trade Union's Institute  5,23 0,02 1,70 0,19 7,59 0,0228
Table 6, cont:  Joint test for forecast rationality and loss function (J-test), quad-quad function, 
1970 to 2007
J-test k=2 p-value J-test k=3 p-value J-test k=4 p-value
Panel (A): Growth forecasts
Berlin Institute 0,20 0,66 2,50 0,11 2,48 0,29
Council of Economic Advisers 0,01 0,93 2,38 0,12 2,43 0,30
Employers Institute 1,62 0,20 0,86 0,36 1,96 0,38
Essen Institute 0,28 0,60 1,79 0,18 1,81 0,40
European Commission, autumn 0,22 0,64 1,14 0,29 1,40 0,50
European Commission, spring 0,93 0,33 0,48 0,49 1,12 0,57
Government Report 0,91 0,34 0,02 0,89 0,92 0,63
Halle Institute 1,49 0,22 1,31 0,25 1,58 0,45
Hamburg Institute 0,24 0,63 0,62 0,43 0,74 0,69
IMF, autumn 0,07 0,79 5,54 0,02 5,59 0,06
IMF, spring 2,59 0,11 1,02 0,31 2,89 0,24
Joint Forecast, autumn 0,03 0,87 2,06 0,15 2,17 0,34
Joint Forecast, spring 0,04 0,83 0,88 0,35 0,89 0,64
Kiel Institute 0,00 0,99 3,63 0,06 3,72 0,16
Munich Institute 0,49 0,49 0,44 0,51 0,81 0,67
OECD 0,43 0,51 1,28 0,26 2,07 0,36
Trade Unions' Institute 0,09 0,77 2,07 0,15 2,08 0,35
Panel (B): Inflation forecasts
Berlin Institute 5,02 0,03 0,79 0,37 5,05 0,08
Council of Economic Advisers 5,69 0,02 3,36 0,07 6,39 0,04
Employer's Institute 1,33 0,25 1,81 0,18 2,02 0,36
Essen Institute 6,82 0,01 3,92 0,05 10,11 0,01
European Commission, autumn 6,39 0,01 1,38 0,24 6,38 0,04
European Commission, spring 2,16 0,14 0,02 0,88 2,82 0,24
Government Report 3,46 0,06 1,27E-
005
1 4,67 0,1
Hamburg Institute 5,11 0,02 1,53 0,22 5,14 0,08
IMF, autumn 2,96 0,09 0,21 0,65 3,38 0,18
IMF, spring 2,66 0,1 1,73 0,19 3,15 0,21
Joint Forecast, autumn 6,21 0,01 1,76 0,18 6,22 0,04
Joint Forecast, spring 1,35 0,25 0,87 0,35 1,57 0,46
Kiel Institute 8,7 0 1,37 0,24 10,37 0,01
Munich Institute 3,21 0,07 1,22 0,27 3,22 0,2
OECD 0,93 0,34 0,21 0,65 0,93 0,63
Trade Union's Institute  5,29 0,02 0,45 0,5 6,25 0,0429
Table 7: Tests for homoscedasticity of the forecast errors, 1970 to 2007
Institution F-value p-value
Growth forecasts
Berlin Institute  0.37  0.70
Council of Economic Advisors  0.01  0.99
Employer's Institute a)  0.01  0.99
Essen Institute  0.38  0.68
European Commission, autumn  0.60  0.56
European Commission, spring 0.001 0.99
Government's Economic Report 0.24   0.79
Halle Institute b)  0.07  0.80
Hamburg Institute  0.16  0.85
IMF, autumn c)  0.25  0.78
IMF, spring d)  0.13  0.88
Joint Forecast, autumn  0.27  0.77
Joint Forecast, spring  0.15 0.86 
Kiel Institute  0.24  0.79
Munich Institute  0.02  0.98
OECD  1.01  0.37
Trade Unions' Institute  0.70  0.60
Inflation forecasts
Berlin Institute  0.46  0.63
Council of Economic Advisors  0.70  0.51
Employer's Institute b)  0.12  0.88
Essen Institute 3.00  0.06
European Commission, autumn  1.82  0.18
European Commission, spring 0.89 0.42
Government's Economic Report  3.11*  0.05
Halle Institute c)  3.25*  0.08
Hamburg Institute  0.28  0.76
IMF, autumn a)  0.11  0.90
IMF, spring d)  2.12  0.14
Joint Forecast, autumn  0.75  0.48
Joint Forecast, spring 0.35  0.71 
Kiel Institute  3.12*  0.06
Munich Institute  0.06  0.94
OECD  0.64  0.53
Trade union' institute  2.29  0.12
*** (**, *) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 (5,10) percent level. a) 1973 to 2007; 1972 to 2007; c) 1993 
to 2007; d) 1971 to 200730
Table 8: Test for forecast optimality under a generalized loss function, 1970 to 
2007
Growth forecasts
Based on equation (8) Based on equation (8)' Based on equation (8),
logit approach
Based on equation (8)',
logit approach
Institution t-value p-value F-value p-value χ
2-value p-value χ
2-value p-value
Berlin Institute -0.001  0.99 0.21 0.81 >0.001 0.99 0.45 0.80
Council of Economic Advisors -0.72  0.48 0.12 0.89 0.54 0.46 0.27 0.87
Employer's Institute a) 0.77  0.45 0.22 0.81 0.62 0.43 0.39 0.82
Essen Institute 0.75  0.46 0.28 0.75 0.59 0.44 0.50 0.79
European Commission, autumn 0.06  0.95 0.14 0.87 0.003 0.95 0.30 0.86
European Commission, spring 1.80* 0.08 1.18 0.32 3.31* 0.07 2.94 0.23
Government's economic report -0.58  0.56 0.90 0.41 0.36 0.55 2.00 0.37
Halle Institute b) -1.32  0.21 1.21 0.34 1.93 0.17 3.40 0.18
Hamburg Institute -0.36  0.72 0.02 0.98 0.14 0.71 0.03 0.98
IMF, autumn c) 0.01  0.99 0.27 0.77 >0.001 0.99 0.65 0.73
IMF, spring d) 1.92*  0.06 2.25 0.12 3.75* 0.053 5.87* 0.053
Joint Forecast, autumn 0.42  0.67 0.67 0.52 0.19 0.66 1.39 0.50
Joint Forecast, spring 1.20 0.24 0.63 0.53 1.48 0.22 0.35 0.71
Kiel Institute 0.53  0.60 0.35 0.71 0.29 0.59 0.72 0.70
Munich institute -0.78  0.44 0.15 0.86 0.64 0.42 0.31 0.86
OECD 0.27  0.79 0.89 0.42 0.07 0.78 1.84 0.40
Trade union' institute 1.51  0.14 0.83 0.44 2.36 0.12 2.16 0.34
Inflation forecasts
Berlin Institute -0.43  0.66 0.68 0.51 0.20 0.65 1.39 0.50
Council of Economic Advisors  -2.59**  0.01 3.43** 0.04 6.12** 0.013 5.57* 0.06
Employer's Institute a)  -1.20  0.23 1.45 0.25 1.51 0.22 2.17 0.34
Essen Institute  -2.95***  0.006 5.10** 0.012 8.19*** 0.004 9.34*** 0.009
European Commission, autumn  -1.02  0.31 1.06 0.36 1.07 0.30 2.08 0.35
European Commission, spring -0.73 0.47 0.24 0.79 0.57 0.45 1.64 0.44
Government's economic report -0.70  0.85 0.34 0.71 0.52 0.47 0.62 0.73
Halle Institute b)  1.79*  0.09 1.84 0.20 3.83* 0.050 4.80* 0.09
Hamburg Institute  -1.04  0.30 0.53 0.59 1.11 0.29 0.91 0.63
IMF, autumn c) -0.39  0.70 0.44 0.65 0.16 0.69 0.93 0.63
IMF, spring d)  0.55  0.58 0.53 0.59 0.32 0.57 1.10 0.58
Joint Forecast, autumn  -0.99  0.33 2.62* 0.09 1.00 0.32 4.50 0.105
Joint Forecast, spring -1.36 0.19 0.79 0.46 1.95 0.16 1.00 0.61
Kiel Institute 0.42  0.68 1.10 0.34 0.18 0.67 2.37 0.31
Munich institute -0.89  0.38 0.40 0.67 0.83 0.36 0.68 0.71
OECD 0.04 0.996 0.59 0.56 >0.001 0.995 1.33 0.51
Trade union' institute 0.52  0.60 1.45 0.25 0.29 0.59 2.86 0.24
*** (**, *) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 (5,10) percent level. a) 1973 to 2007; 1972 to 2007; c) 1993 to 2007; d) 1971 to 200731
Figure 1: Estimated asymmetric (lin-lin)-loss-functions (αk = 3), growth forecasts
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Figure 1b: Estimated asymmetric (lin-lin)-loss-functions (αk = 3), inflation 
forecasts
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Figure 2: Estimated asymmetric (quad-quad)-loss-functions (αk = 3), growth 
forecasts
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Figure 2b: Estimated asymmetric (quad-quad)-loss-functions (αk = 3), inflation 
forecasts
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Figure 3: A linex loss function and the impact of the asymmetry parameter
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